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Abstract
Beginning in 2005, the SEC required firms to include qualitative disclosures of risk factors in item 1A in their
annual 10-K forms. In this paper, we examine the textual content of this section and determine whether it
reflects the firm’s performance. We first categorized each risk disclosure that a firm presented into one of 29
categories and then examined these categorizations. Our investigation yields three main results. First, we find
that several risk factor categories, such as government and competitive risks, are common across our sample of
firms. Second, we find that a firm’s industry classification (as given by its SIC code) is not a differentiating
factor in the disclosures that a firm makes. Third, we find that risk factor disclosures are generally not
predictive of a firm’s financial performance in the form of leverage, capital structure, cash, and acquisitions.
Our analysis expands on previous work by considering the content of the disclosures in more detail rather
than focusing on more quantitative characteristics of disclosures.
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Risk Disclosures in SEC Corporate Filings 
Abstract 
Beginning in 2005, the SEC required firms to include qualitative disclosures of risk 
factors in item 1A in their annual 10-K forms. In this paper, we examine the textual content of 
this section and determine whether it reflects the firm’s performance. We first categorized each 
risk disclosure that a firm presented into one of 29 categories and then examined these 
categorizations. Our investigation yields three main results. First, we find that several risk factor 
categories, such as government and competitive risks, are common across our sample of firms. 
Second, we find that a firm’s industry classification (as given by its SIC code) is not a 
differentiating factor in the disclosures that a firm makes. Third, we find that risk factor 
disclosures are generally not predictive of a firm’s financial performance in the form of leverage, 
capital structure, cash, and acquisitions. Our analysis expands on previous work by considering 
the content of the disclosures in more detail rather than focusing on more quantitative 
characteristics of disclosures. 
 
Introduction 
In the United States, public companies must submit Form 10-K to the Securities and 
Exchanges Commission (SEC) annually. Though investors often use the 10-K form to access a 
firm’s four financial statements, it also gives a summary of a company’s performance as well as 
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supplementary qualitative and quantitative statements about the firm’s condition, such as the 
company’s history, organizational structure, and executive compensation. 
Beginning in 2005, the SEC required a new section in annual 10-K reports, section 1A, in 
which firms are required to discuss the “most significant factors that make the company 
speculative or risky”1. As with other disclosures and financial information, firms are required to 
update these disclosures quarterly if they change from the previous annual filing. The SEC also 
provides guidelines for organizing the section as well as examples of relevant risk factors, such 
as: 
 Lack of an operating history 
 Lack of profitable operations in recent periods 
 Financial position 
 Business or proposed business 
 Lack of a market for […] common equity securities or securities convertible into 
or exercisable for common equity securities 
Criticism of the SEC’s disclosure requirements centers around two main arguments. First, 
since disclosures can be purely qualitative, firms do not have to estimate the economic effect of a 
disclosed risk on the firm’s financial performance, thus making it difficult for investors to 
incorporate their content into their decisions. Second, firms do not have to quantify the 
likelihood that a disclosed risk will ultimately affect the company, so managers could disclose all 
possible risks and uncertainties rather than focusing on the risks that are relevant to their firm, 
resulting in information that is of little utility to investors and the public. In response, managers 
                                                          
1
 Regulation S-K, Item 305(c), SEC 2005 
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might argue that estimating such likelihoods would be difficult even with inside information, and 
such disclosures could require firms to disclose proprietary information
2
. 
In 2010, because of these criticisms, the SEC revised its guidelines to instruct firms not to 
“present risks that could apply to any issuer or any offering,” but judging the effectiveness of this 
revision will require both time (for firms to file 10-K forms under the revised guidelines) and 
detailed analysis (to identify the effect, if any, of the revision)
3
. 
This goal of this project is to explore the content of the “Risk Factors” section (item 1A) 
of the form 10-K. We are interested in determining whether the textual content of the risk 
disclosure has any relationship with the firm’s performance. 
Investigating the content of risk disclosures is important to investors as well as regulators. 
First, since item 1A is over 10 percent of the form 10-K (on average)
4
, identifying the 
effectiveness of the disclosures is essential to ensure transparent yet efficient reporting. In 
addition, identifying specific weaknesses can ensure that the disclosure guidelines are useful for 
firms across industries, sizes, etc. Second, following the recent financial crisis, the SEC has 
increased its focus on more effective risk factor disclosures. In fact, the SEC identified 
“inadequate disclosure issues” as the most frequent issue in its comment letters about U.S. 
companies’ annual and quarterly filings dated between January 2009 and July 2010. 
To date, we could identify only one other study that has investigated item 1A disclosures, 
by looking at the impact of the length of risk factor disclosures and type of risk (idiosyncratic, 
systematic, financial, tax, litigation)
5
. As such, it is important to understand both the accuracy of 
                                                          
2
 Campbell, John L. et al. “The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor Disclosures in Corporate Filings.” 
SSRN eLibrary (2010): 10 May 2011. 
33
 Johnson, Sarah. “SEC Pushes Companies for More Risk Information.” CFO 2 Aug 2010. 10 May 2011. 
4
 Campbell, John L. et al. “The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor Disclosures in Corporate Filings.” 
SSRN eLibrary (2010): 10 May 2011. 
5
 Ibid. 
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the disclosures as well as identify whether and how investors and the market utilize these 
disclosures. Moreover, correlating the risks with accounting data as we do could provide 
evidence either for or against the utility of the risk disclosures. 
 
Methodology 
Specifically, our investigation consisted of three stages. First, we developed a basic 
categorization of the risk factors that firms outline in item 1A of the 10-K. Since many firms 
identify common risk factors (for example, competition or supply disruptions), this allowed us to 
identify the commonalities among firms. We did this for a simple random sample of 122 firms. 
(The random sample was generated using the firms in the COMPUSTAT database, and 10-K 
filings are publicly available on the SEC’s website. Because of variability in firms’ fiscal years 
end dates, we considered the documents submitted in 2009, either for fiscal years ending at the 
end of 2008 or midway through the 2009 calendar year. For a list of firms used, see Appendix I.) 
Initially, as the risk factors can be lengthy, we categorized each risk in one of 116 relatively 
specific categories. Examples of categories included general risk factors such as “competition” 
as well as very specific factors such as foreign supply chains. A complete list of the initial 
categories is included in Appendix II. 
To provide more meaningful and statistically predictive categories, we next consolidated 
the risk factor categories into the following smaller list of 29 categories: 
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Table 1 
For each company, the consolidated category was simply the logical disjunction of each of the 
categories of which it was composed. The combination of categories that gave the consolidated 
category list is provided in Appendix III. We used this list of 29 categories for all further 
analyses. 
Second, after categorizing the risk disclosures for each of the 122 selected firms, we 
computed descriptive statistics on the various categories. Our goal was to note categories that are 
nearly ubiquitous to help identify the disclosures that are essentially “boilerplate” (used 
repetitively across most of the filings) and reveal which disclosures are likely to provide relevant 
information specific to an individual firm. We also evaluated differences in risk factors across 
industries (as grouped by the first digit or first two digits of a company’s SIC code) with the 
intention of determining whether a firm’s industry is the primary driver of its risk factor 
disclosures. 
Finally, we investigated relationships between various accounting measures of the firm 
and the related risk categorizations using regression; we were looking for any operating risk 
accounting international
acquisitions inventory
calamities investments
capital expenditures key personnel
capital structure labor
cash legal
competition macro
contracts marketing
credit risk operations
customer concentration regional
distribution solvency
government stock price
industry suppliers
insurance takeovers
intellectual property
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factors or the total number of risk factors to influence metrics such as leverage, capital 
expenditures, cash, or acquisitions. 
 
Results 
After completing the categorization, we first calculated basic statistics for each 
consolidated risk category, such as the total number of companies that mentioned a risk in that 
category (“sum”), as well as the average number of companies that mentioned that category 
(“mean”) and its respective standard deviation: 
 
Table 2 
In the table above, the five most common categories are highlighted in yellow. As we expected, 
“macro” factors, such as global recessions, the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, or inflation 
were very frequent. In addition, as expected, risks related to capital structure, such as too much 
leverage or an inability to make interest payments, were also frequent. Surprisingly, we found 
that cash or liquidity was not a very common risk factor, which could indicate that the firms in 
our sample seemed to feel comfortable enough with their short-term lending arrangements that 
they would not list cash availability as a major risk. 
For a graphical presentation of the material in Table 1, see Appendix IV. In looking at a 
bar chart, we did notice one significant fact in the data. There do seem to be “clusters” of a few 
Category Sum Mean SD Category Sum Mean SD Category Sum Mean SD
accounting 38 0.31 0.47 distribution 24 0.20 0.40 legal 69 0.57 0.50
acquisitions 74 0.61 0.49 government 104 0.85 0.36 macro 91 0.75 0.44
calamities 29 0.24 0.43 industry 26 0.21 0.41 marketing 40 0.33 0.47
capital expenditures 14 0.11 0.32 insurance 25 0.20 0.41 operations 76 0.62 0.49
capital structure 88 0.72 0.45 intellectual property 56 0.46 0.50 regional 4 0.03 0.18
cash 16 0.13 0.34 international 59 0.48 0.50 solvency 37 0.30 0.46
competition 101 0.83 0.38 inventory 13 0.11 0.31 stock price 77 0.63 0.48
contracts 41 0.34 0.47 investments 23 0.19 0.39 suppliers 71 0.58 0.50
credit risk 17 0.14 0.35 key personnel 85 0.70 0.46 takeovers 42 0.34 0.48
customer concentration 40 0.33 0.47 labor 12 0.10 0.30
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of the categories, such as government and competition, or macro, capital structure, and key 
personnel. In addition, we noticed a sharper reduction in frequency after intellectual property, 
with the remaining risks being almost one-third less frequent. 
We also evaluated correlations between consolidated risk factor categories to identify 
categories that should either be excluded. We first generated a complete correlation matrix, and 
color-coded cells with a gradient from -1 to 1 to identify strong correlations. (This table is 
provided in Appendix V.) We did not notice any correlation strong enough that the categories 
needed to be merged. Overall, we did notice that the categories showed some slight positive 
correlation around 0.1, as visible in the figure below: 
 
Figure 1 
Also, as visible in the histogram in Figure 1, there were no correlations above 0.5, and few above 
0.4, giving us confidence that our categorizations were independent when conducting statistical 
analysis and regression analysis. 
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We next investigated the presence of differences in risk factor disclosures across 
industries. We first defined “industries” as companies with the same first digit of their SIC code, 
and computed means for each of them; the values for each industry and category are presented in 
Appendix VI. As we hypothesized, when glancing only at the mean values numerically, the 
values seemed to differ across industries, with “international” risk and intellectual property risk 
being prime examples. 
However, when we tested the means for differences, we found very little significance. 
For our statistical tests, we tried grouping firms by both the first digit and the first two-digits of 
their SIC code, and for each consolidated risk category, we used a Kruskal-Wallis test to identify 
industries that stood out, essentially providing a non-parametric analysis of variance with firms 
grouped by industry. Our null hypothesis was that the means were equal (i.e.             
             ), and our alternative hypothesis was that at least one of the industries had a 
different mean than the rest. Our results (in the form of p-values) are summarized below: 
 
Table 3 
In table 3, the most significant tests are highlighted in red, and demonstrated   
    
  
      . 
(We divided by 29 to provide a Bonferroni correction for multiple testing.) In addition, we 
SIC 1-digit P-value SIC 2-digit P-value SIC 1-digit P-value SIC 2-digit P-value
accounting 0.102 0.705 insurance 0.243 0.020
acquisitions 0.276 0.280 international 0.000 0.011
marketing 0.488 0.697 intellectual property 0.010 0.002
capital strucutre 0.608 0.610 key personnel 0.666 0.237
capital expenditures 0.422 0.609 legal 0.926 0.740
cash 0.756 0.992 solvency 0.542 0.559
takeovers 0.293 0.690 calamities 0.296 0.824
competition 0.742 0.433 investments 0.379 0.407
credit risk 0.698 0.529 operations 0.155 0.011
customer concentration 0.821 0.567 regional 0.199 0.001
inventory 0.259 0.831 stock price 0.238 0.024
distribution 0.721 0.674 contracts 0.702 0.196
government 0.074 0.011 suppliers 0.000 0.003
industry 0.142 0.024 labor 0.182 0.054
macro 0.385 0.642
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highlighted in yellow those tests with        and in green those with       . Even with 
these generous cutoffs, however, very few tests seemed significant. 
As an alternative approach, we attempted to use principal component analysis to see if 
industry classification was a major driver of variation in our risk categorizations. Principal 
component analysis “rotates” the dataset such that the maximum variance is captured by the first 
few principal components, allowing us to reduce the dimensionality of the data. We considered 
the first two principal components for each company, and grouped companies by the first digit of 
their SIC code to identify any potential clustering: 
 
Figure 2 
As visible in the figure above, we did not see any clustering in the data based on the SIC code, 
indicating that for at least the first two principal components of the data, industry classification is 
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not a major source of variance. We saw similar results for the third and fourth principal 
components as well (figure not shown). 
There are a few potential explanations for the results we have seen regarding the 
relationship between industry and risk disclosures. One possibility is that disclosures are firm-
specific and that firms distinguish their disclosures other firms in the same industry; thus, the fact 
that industry is not a major driver of variation is a positive aspect because it means that each firm 
provides information in its disclosure that an investor could not derive easily based on its 
industry affiliation. 
The second possibility is that disclosures are in fact less informative than we might hope 
because they do not reflect a major source of risk: industry-wide risk. This is supported by the 
fact that several of the consolidated categories, such as government and macro risks, are common 
across almost all of the companies in our sample. In fact, the 10 most common categories are 
present in well over half of the companies. To test this further, one would need a method of 
identifying the expected similarity between two given companies’ risk disclosures, to understand 
the similarity two randomly selected annual reports. 
A third possibility is that our analysis simply used a sample size that was too small to 
detect statistically significant differences between categories. (To check this, one would need to 
repeat the analysis with a substantially larger sample size, and/or develop an automated method 
of categorizing large numbers of 10-K filings.) 
The final step of our analysis consisted of evaluating the relationship between our 
categorizations and various accounting metrics. We used four different independent variables, 
normalized as appropriate to account for firm size: 
 Total debt (divided by total assets) 
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 Capital expenditures (divided by net property, plant, and equipment) 
 Cash (divided by total assets) 
 Cash acquisitions (divided by net property, plant, and equipment) 
As independent variables, we used the following: 
 All operating risk categories (as binary variables); we included the following 
consolidated risk categories as “operating risk”: 
 
Table 4 
 Total number of risk factors, as well as the logarithm of the total number of risk 
factors 
First, we conducted the regression of total debt upon operating risk, and found the 
following: 
competition macro
credit risk intellectual property
customer concentration operations
inventory contracts
distribution suppliers
government labor
industry
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Table 5 
This regression was clearly insignificant overall, but more surprisingly, we found that none of 
the operating risk categories predicted debt amount in a statistically significant way. In addition, 
we found that only around 10 percent of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained 
by these categories, as indicated by the low    value. 
However, several of the coefficient signs were somewhat interesting. For example, both 
competition and macro risks were approaching significance (and perhaps would be significant in 
a larger sample), but competition seemed to result in increased leverage while macroeconomic 
risks resulted in reduced leverage. One possible explanation is that competition forces firms to be 
more aggressive in the market, leading them to borrow more and take more risks, while macro 
risk factors cannot be predicted or “defeated,” and should therefore result in reduced leverage. 
Dependent Variable Debt / Total Assets
Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value
intercept 0.283 0.016
'competition' 0.182 0.060
'credit risk' -0.029 0.778
'customer concentration' -0.053 0.460
'inventory' 0.072 0.523
'distribution' 0.018 0.842
'government' 0.033 0.743
'industry' 0.136 0.094
'macro' -0.151 0.061
'intellectual property' -0.090 0.248
'operations' -0.083 0.287
'contracts' 0.005 0.946
'suppliers' -0.010 0.885
'labor' 0.090 0.443
R-square 0.103
F-test P-Value 0.503
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We next checked for the relationship between leverage (debt divided by total assets) and 
the total number of risk factors: 
 
Table 6 
However, we found that neither the total number of risk factors nor its logarithm was a 
significant explanatory factor. Based on previous work
6
 that has found a relationship between 
market-based risk measures and length of risk disclosures, we did expect some relationship since 
the total number of risk factors should be associated with disclosure length. Therefore, we were 
surprised to find no relationship. 
We next investigated the relationship between total capital expenditures and operating 
risk, and found the following: 
                                                          
6
 Campbell, John L. et al. “The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor Disclosures in Corporate Filings.” 
SSRN eLibrary (2010): 10 May 2011. 
Dependent Variable Debt / Total Assets Dependent Variable Debt / Total Assets
Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value Variable Independent Variable P-Value
intercept 0.291 0.005 intercept 0.180 0.505
total number of risk factors -0.001 0.906 log(total number of risk factors) 0.039 0.720
R-square 0.000 R-square 0.001
F-test P-Value 0.906 F-test P-Value 0.720
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Table 7 
Quite interestingly, we found this regression to be significant overall, but the only significant 
independent variable was intellectual property, with a positive relationship. This seems quite 
reasonable and expected, since firms with significant capital expenditures often have significant 
amounts of money invested in research and development infrastructure. 
We also found a significant relationship between capital expenditures and the total 
number of risk factors: 
 
Table 8 
Dependent Variable CapEx / PPE
Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value
intercept 0.245 0.000
'competition' -0.045 0.356
'credit risk' -0.004 0.942
'customer concentration' -0.033 0.353
'inventory' 0.019 0.741
'distribution' 0.015 0.751
'government' 0.043 0.394
'industry' -0.065 0.111
'macro' 0.003 0.948
'intellectual property' 0.132 0.001
'operations' 0.042 0.288
'contracts' 0.044 0.266
'suppliers' -0.027 0.448
'labor' -0.086 0.145
R-square 0.272
F-test P-Value 0.001
Dependent Variable CapEx / PPE Dependent Variable CapEx / PPE
Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value
intercept 0.154 0.007 intercept -0.095 0.518
total number of risk factors 0.013 0.005 log(total number of risk factors) 0.162 0.007
R-square 0.063 R-square 0.062
F-test P-Value 0.005 F-test P-Value 0.007
Mirakhur 15 
This was surprising given our results on leverage and total number of risk factors. We cannot 
explain the fact that capital expenditures seem more sensitive to the total number of risk factors 
described in item 1A. 
We found very similar results when we next compared cash to operating risk and total 
number of risk factors: 
 
Table 9 
 
Table 10 
Cash
Dependent Variable Cash / Total Assets
Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value
intercept 0.121 0.030
'competition' -0.038 0.403
'credit risk' 0.026 0.599
'customer concentration' -0.031 0.361
'inventory' 0.005 0.924
'distribution' -0.023 0.594
'government' 0.082 0.085
'industry' -0.018 0.640
'macro' -0.068 0.078
'intellectual property' 0.154 0.000
'operations' 0.017 0.644
'contracts' 0.084 0.027
'suppliers' -0.061 0.075
'labor' 0.001 0.982
R-square 0.359
F-test P-Value 0.000
Dependent Variable Cash / Total Assets Dependent Variable Cash / Total Assets
Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value
intercept 0.013 0.812 intercept -0.180 0.227
total number of risk factors 0.013 0.004 log(total number of risk factors) 0.143 0.018
R-square 0.067 R-square 0.047
F-test P-Value 0.004 F-test P-Value 0.018
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Interestingly, we noticed similar relationships for cash that we saw for capital expenditures. We 
hypothesized that this could be because of a strong correlation between amounts of cash that a 
company holds and the amount of capital expenditures it can undertake, and we found the 
correlation between these two independent variables to be 0.46. 
Finally, when we used acquisitions (normalized by dividing by total PPE) as a dependent 
variable, we found almost no predictive power: 
 
Table 11 
 
Table 12 
Dependent Variable Acquisitions / PPE
Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value
intercept 0.075 0.884
'competition' 0.336 0.430
'credit risk' -0.256 0.591
'customer concentration' -0.050 0.874
'inventory' 0.843 0.091
'distribution' -0.141 0.726
'government' 0.227 0.605
'industry' -0.011 0.977
'macro' -0.007 0.983
'intellectual property' 0.220 0.526
'operations' -0.365 0.292
'contracts' -0.290 0.411
'suppliers' 0.133 0.679
'labor' -0.303 0.559
R-square 0.057
F-test P-Value 0.923
Dependent Variable Acquisitions / PPE Dependent Variable Acquisitions / PPE
Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value Independent Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value
intercept -0.246 0.573 intercept -1.516 0.191
total number of risk factors 0.052 0.138 log(total number of risk factors) 0.765 0.102
R-square 0.019 R-square 0.023
F-test P-Value 0.138 F-test P-Value 0.102
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Conclusions 
Our investigation made three conclusions. First, we found that certain risk factor 
categories, such as government and competitive risks, were mentioned in the vast majority of 
risk factor disclosures. 
Second, we found that for most risk factor categories, there were not statistically 
significant differences across industries. However, a few categories, such as international and 
supplier risk, seemed significant, though we could not explain these results. 
Third, we found through our regression analysis that intellectual property risk and total 
number of risk factors were statistically predictive of both capital expenditures and cash, but not 
of leverage or acquisitions. Overall, however, we found that operating risk factor disclosure were 
not useful in predicting a firm’s financial accounting characteristics. While we proposed some 
explanations for these results, further analysis could certainly investigate these relationships 
further. 
 
Future Work 
Perhaps the easiest possibility for future analysis involves increasing our sample size to 
understand whether our lack of significance when exploring differences across industry is simply 
because of a lack of power given the fact that we are only using 122 firms. One variant could be 
developing an electronic/automated method of processing large numbers of annual filings. 
Second, future studies could explore relationships between risk and a firm’s financial 
performance longitudinally over time, or for specific high-risk industries (such as energy 
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exploration, for example) since risk disclosures in such industries should have much more 
meaning and importance for both investors and regulators. 
Third, future studies could explore market reactions to risk disclosures in more detail to 
identify whether disclosures result in more efficient allocation of capital. This could be in the 
form of measuring changes in the risk factor disclosures in annual filings, separating their effect 
from financial performance effects, and measuring the effect of these changes in variables such 
as stock prices, bond yields, etc. 
We would also be interested in exploring whether risk factors can be used instead of 
stock price volatility or earnings volatility to measure firm risk. Thus, another exploration could 
measure the relationship between market-based risk measures and qualitative risk factors, and 
seeing whether relationships that are observed for market-based measures are also present when 
conducting the analysis using qualitative factors. 
A final possibility for future exploration is to analyze the relationship between a firm’s 
risk disclosures and key person life insurance. Many firms purchase life insurance on their chief 
executives or presidents (“key personnel”), especially if the firm’s leader provides specific 
technical expertise and is anticipated to stay in the company for an extended period. Moreover, 
many firms disclose the life insurance they purchase for their executives. Since purchasing key 
person life insurance is, in some ways, a measure of the risk aversion of the firm’s leadership, we 
would be interested in looking at whether the risk categorizations we previously developed have 
any relationship with key person life insurance. This would pose some challenges with data 
collection, as firms often do not provide enough specific details about the key person life 
insurance that they purchase (for example, which executives are insured, for exactly how much, 
and how much this insurance costs), which could make meaningful analysis impractical.
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Appendix I 
The following tables list the legal name and COMPUSTAT GVKEY identification number for 
all the companies in our random sample. 
 
(continued on next page) 
Company Legal Name     COMPUSTAT GVKEY Company Legal Name     COMPUSTAT GVKEY
Avon Products Inc. 1920 America's Car-Mart Inc 13602
Campbell Soup Co 2663 Dell Inc 14489
Cardinal Health Inc 2751 Concord Camera Corp 14808
Crane Co. 3580 Lattice Semiconductor Corp 16597
Crown Holdings Inc 3619 Fisher Communications Inc 18364
Duckwall Alco Stores Inc 4090 G III Apparel Group Ltd 19402
Environmental Tectonics Corp 4415 Contango Oil & Gas Co 22053
Jo-Ann Stores Inc. 4523 Wet Seal Inc (The) 22612
Ferro Corp. 4622 Exponent Inc 23027
HEICO Corp 5567 Community Health Systems Inc 23714
Herley Industries Inc 5594 ARI Network Services Inc 24670
Hovnanian Enterprises Inc. 5750 Genta Inc 24781
PhotoMedex Inc 6598 Vitesse Semiconductor Corp 24803
Florida Gaming Corp 6694 Terra Nitrogen Co LP 24965
Medical Action Industries Inc 7205 McAfee Inc 25783
Methode Electronics Inc 7291 Innodata Isogen Inc 28717
Myers Industries Inc. 7636 Oxigene Inc 28795
Northrop Grumman Corp 7985 Ultratech Inc 28938
Potlatch Corp 8692 AK Steel Holding Corp 29968
Regis Corp 9023 Eagle Materials Inc 30032
Lodgian Inc. 9614 International Textile Group Inc 30169
Standard Motor Products Inc. 10000 McMoRan Exploration Co 30234
Tellabs Inc 10420 GEO Group Inc (The) 30536
US 1 Industries Inc 10676 Stillwater Mining Co 31203
United Stationers Inc 10981 Borders Group Inc 31849
Vulcan Materials Co 11228 Socket Mobile Inc 60801
Meridian Resource Corp (The) 12046 Wayside Technology Group 61028
Astec Industries Inc. 12262 Tarrant Apparel Group 61060
Harley-Davidson Inc. 12389 Opko Health Inc 61490
IsoRay Inc 12818 Buckeye Technologies Inc 61596
Nobel Learning Communities Inc 12855 Westell Technologies Inc 61646
Georgia Gulf Corp. 12895 Nuance Communications Inc 61685
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Company Legal Name     COMPUSTAT GVKEY Company Legal Name     COMPUSTAT GVKEY
Pinnacle Data Systems Inc. 62768 Martin Midstream Partners LP 150201
Genesee & Wyoming Inc. 63123 Universal Technical Institute Inc. 156633
Diedrich Coffee Inc 63572 Santarus Inc 157954
Q.E.P. Co. Inc 63593 Metalico Inc 160474
Penske Automotive Group Inc 63847 Westlake Chemical Corp 160684
Famous Dave's of America Inc 63930 NationsHealth Inc 161816
Take-Two Interactive Software Inc 64630 Peoples Educational Holdings Inc 161869
Evolving Systems Inc 110529 Unica Corp 162355
Interstate Hotels & Resorts Inc. 113439 Sunesis Pharmaceuticals Inc 162585
Tigrent Inc 114242 Rockwood Holdings Inc 162957
Vignette Corp 118445 Lotus Pharmaceuticals Inc 163088
Varian Inc 119216 Solar Enertech Corp 165269
Priceline.Com Inc 119314 Coleman Cable Inc 165640
PLX Technology Inc 119493 Viacom Inc 165675
tw telecom inc 120359 Castle Brands Inc 165691
Salem Communications Corp 121817 H&E Equipment Services Inc 165856
Next Inc 122914 Global Traffic Network Inc 166402
Maxygen Inc 127481 Volcano Corp 174118
Sequenom Inc 128663 Pharmasset Inc 174507
Occam Networks Inc 137130 EV Energy Partners LP 175006
deCODE genetics Inc 137803 Armstrong World Industries Inc 175689
Illumina Inc 138205 XTENT Inc 175743
Peet's Coffee & Tea Inc 140897 Universal Power Group Inc 176325
Seattle Genetics Inc 141460 Accuray Inc 176670
Lawson Software Inc 144135 HSW International Inc 178494
Asbury Automotive Group Inc 144640 Power Medical Interventions Inc 178722
Corcept Therapeutics Inc 146616
Cycle Country Accessories Corp 147101
Overstock.com Inc 147868
TransDigm Group Inc 148349
TravelCenters of America LLC 148350
Nile Therapeutics Inc 148552
Mirakhur 21 
Appendix II 
Our initial categorization of risk factors consisted of 116 categories, listed below: 
 
  
accounting control industry condition quarterly variation
accounting standards inflation raw materials availability
acquisitions information security raw materials prices
assets: liens information technology real estate
brand insurance region-specific
brand concentration interest rates regulatory
capital availability international (non-US) risk regulatory: government contracts
capital expenditures international markets (challenges) reputation
cash requirements inventory management research and development
charter documents IP restructuring
competition IP: legal defense revenue: inconsistent
competition: lower prices IP: value safety
consumer preferences joint ventures seasonality
contracts: estimated value key personnel shareholder rights plan
cost savings key personnel: insurance single product
credit rating leases stock price
credit risk legal / litigation stock price: delisting
currency / exchange rates liability stock price: issuance b/c of derivatives
customer concentration liquidity / investments stock price: volatility
cyclical business losses: future stock: no dividends
debt: additional losses: past stock: thinly traded
debt: covenants macroeconomy subcontractors
debt: highly levered management ownership substitute products
debt: refinancing manufacturing / technical suppliers: concentration
deferred taxes market acceptance suppliers: promotions
delivery delays market share supply chain
demand: unpredictable marketing effectiveness supply chain: foreign
dispositions merger benefits tax legislation
distribution channels natural disasters technological change
energy prices new management technology: unproven
environmental new products terrorism / war
financial crisis new stores third party
financial services ongoing legal proceedings transportation
fixed price contracts operating risk unions / labor
franchise terminations ownership concentration weather
going concern pension / retirement benefits working capital
goodwill write downs / intangible asset risk political
government contracts/funding pricing
government programs product quality
industry changes production delay
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After the initial categorization, the categories were consolidated according to the following table: 
 
  
Consolidated Category Original Categories
accounting accounting control, accounting standards
acquisitions acquisitions, cost savings, joint ventures, merger benefits, restructuring
calamities natural disasters, terrorism / war, weather
capital expenditures capital expenditures, research and development
capital structure
assets: liens, capital availability, credit rating, debt: additional, debt: covenants, debt: highly levered, 
debt: refinancing, interest rates
cash cash requirements
competition competition, competition: lower prices, substitute products
contracts contracts: estimated value, fixed price contracts, franchise terminations, subcontractors, third party
credit risk credit risk
customer concentration customer concentration
distribution distribution channels, transportation
government
environmental, government contracts/funding, government programs, political, regulatory, regulatory: 
government contracts, tax legislation
industry industry changes, industry condition
insurance insurance
intellectual property IP, IP: legal defense, IP: value
international currency / exchange rates, international (non-US) risk, international markets (challenges)
inventory delivery delays, inventory management
investments liquidity / investments, pension / retirement benefits
key personnel key personnel, key personnel: insurance, new management
labor unions / labor
legal legal / litigation, liability, ongoing legal proceedings, safety
macro
cyclical business, demand: unpredictable, financial crisis, financial services, inflation, macroeconomy, 
quarterly variation, revenue: inconsistent, seasonality
marketing
brand, brand concentration, consumer preferences, market acceptance, market share, marketing 
effectiveness, pricing, reputation
operations
leases, manufacturing / technical, new products, new stores, operating risk, product quality, 
production delay, single product, technological change, technology: unproven, working capital
regional region-specific
solvency going concern, losses: future, losses: past
stock price
management ownership, ownership concentration, stock price, stock price: delisting, stock price: 
issuance b/c of derivatives, stock price: volatility, stock: no dividends, stock: thinly traded
suppliers
energy prices, raw materials availability, raw materials prices, suppliers: concentration, suppliers: 
promotions, supply chain, supply chain: foreign
takeovers charter documents, shareholder rights plan
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Mining & 
Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
Transportation, 
Comm., Utilities
Wholesale & 
Retail Trade
Services Services
SIC Code 1000 SIC Code 2000 SIC Code 3000 SIC Code 4000 SIC Code 5000 SIC Code 7000 SIC Code 8000
accounting 0.29 0.08 0.34 0.17 0.44 0.47 0.38
acquisitions 0.71 0.60 0.61 0.33 0.44 0.82 0.63
calamities 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.50 0.11 0.41 0.25
capital 
expenditures
0.29 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.25
capital 
structure
1.00 0.76 0.71 0.67 0.72 0.59 0.75
cash 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.13
competition 0.86 0.92 0.83 0.67 0.78 0.76 0.88
contracts 0.43 0.32 0.29 0.50 0.22 0.47 0.38
credit risk 0.29 0.04 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.13
customer 
concentration
0.29 0.28 0.39 0.50 0.22 0.29 0.38
distribution 0.14 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.28 0.18 0.00
government 1.00 0.80 0.90 0.67 0.67 0.94 1.00
industry 0.14 0.04 0.22 0.50 0.22 0.35 0.25
insurance 0.57 0.12 0.17 0.33 0.22 0.18 0.25
intellectual 
property
0.00 0.52 0.61 0.17 0.28 0.59 0.25
international 0.00 0.44 0.68 0.17 0.28 0.76 0.13
inventory 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00
investments 0.14 0.24 0.27 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.25
key personnel 0.57 0.56 0.76 0.67 0.78 0.71 0.75
labor 0.00 0.16 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.00
legal 0.43 0.56 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.63
macro 0.71 0.60 0.78 0.67 0.89 0.82 0.63
marketing 0.29 0.36 0.27 0.17 0.28 0.41 0.63
operations 0.71 0.68 0.76 0.33 0.44 0.53 0.50
regional 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00
solvency 0.43 0.44 0.29 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.13
stock price 0.43 0.72 0.68 0.33 0.50 0.76 0.50
suppliers 1.00 0.56 0.78 0.17 0.72 0.12 0.25
takeovers 0.14 0.44 0.37 0.00 0.28 0.47 0.25
